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RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
A LAMENT
The legal revolution of the past 25 years has dramatically changed tort law, but
not for the better. The inexorable expansion of liability has taken place on two fronts.
The scope of the defendant's basic liability has increased, while the available
defenses have been whittled away. This one-two combination has worked dramatic
effects that could not be gleaned from looking at each change in isolation. While the
changes have been massive, the justifications offered for them have been inadequate.
In a short paper it is quite foolish to attempt to assay the entire landscape of tort
doctrine, from causation, to proof, to foreseeability, to privity, to assumption of risk.
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that this vast array of doctrinal changes have not
occurred at random. Quite the contrary they all reflect a uniform, if misguided, vision
of the role of tort law in particular and of legal rules in general. My hope is to isolate
one central methodological weakness of modem tort law and to show, however
briefly, the influence it exerts on a large number of doctrinal areas. That weakness is
the incurable judicial fondness for replacing fixed rules of tort liability with
open-ended balancing tests. The now common risk/utility test, as developed by
Professor Wade, I is the foremost illustration of the new approach and the unfortunate
social consequences that it produces.
The paper is divided into two sections. The first section of this paper argues that
rules of thumb should be preferred over balancing tests generally. The second section
gives some examples of workable bright line rules and concludes with a brief critique
of the risk/utility doctrine generally.
I. RULE, DON'T BALANCE
My basic thesis is that rules should be preferred to balancing tests, both for basic
liability and for defenses. To be sure, this opposition between rules and balancing is
not ironclad. Every system has to have a little "give" in the joints to take care of the
complex or unanticipated cases that do not fall neatly into the available paradigms.
Bright line rules are not etched with laser sharpness. Yet the overriding distinction
between rules and balancing tests remains structurally important notwithstanding the
occasional blurriness at the edges. The critical inquiry is whether each case that
comes before judge or jury must receive the same level of anxious consideration that
is properly reserved for the most difficult ones. The advantage of well-crafted rules
is that they can account for the routine case in a predictable and sensible fashion,
while reserving the give in the system for the few atypical cases that remain. As an
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empirical matter, the vast majority of cases do not raise questions of insanity or
private necessity. The typical chain of causation (as Fleming James, an ex-railway
lawyer, used to stress in class while banging his right fist into his left hand) does not
present a bewildering succession of deliberate and unforeseeable intervening actions
and events. The extraordinary may triumph over the mundane in appellate litigation,
owing to the selection bias that forces the hardest cases to the top of the system. 2
Nonetheless, it does not have to do so in the workaday world of ordinary litigation.
Traditional rules of thumb are serviceable over the broad run of cases. These should
be preserved against the wholesale or frontal attacks that have been made against
them. What do these rules of thumb look like? And why are they sound?
In asking these questions, we have to focus to some degree on the possible ends
of the tort system. These ends can be stated in both a broad and a narrow way. In the
broadest sense, the mission of the law is to maximize the welfare of the various
individuals who are subject to its governance. At times this goes under the name of
utility maximization; at other times the preferred formulation is wealth maximization.
While there are learned disputes between these various formulations of the
consequentialist position, I do not want to trouble myself with them here. 3 The
overlap in the different versions of consequentialist theory is very substantial, so that
the differences (e.g., how one treats unique subjective values) can be ignored in a
general discussion.
Yet note the irony. The articulation of any maximization principle is enough to
daunt the most determined of lawyers who comes to praise the rule of thumb. If the
concern is with a well-crafted system of rules, then there must be a retreat from
abstract principles that necessarily leave an enormous amount of play in the joints.
The utilitarian, who is able to step momentarily outside the systemic chains, should
understand the utilitarian boobytrap in any rule of decision that purports to capture
each utilitarian nuance on its face.4 Lofty ambitions do not make good rules. Often
it is better to lose a bit in comprehensive overview in order to gain something in
workaday precision.
The point can be stated more clearly. The validity of any substantive norm has
to be tempered by the reliability of its application. Validity and reliability stand in
inverse relation to each other. Validity seeks to identify the ultimate thing to be
measured, while reliability seeks to insure that the measurements undertaken are done
accurately. Refined rules seek to control every possibility, and thus to maximize
validity. But these rules are very difficult to administer. It is necessary, therefore, to
surrender some validity in order to gain additional reliability. What one wants to
maximize is the product of the two, which can never be done by insisting upon perfect
validity or reliability-that is by setting either validity or reliability at one. (If both
2. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL Slut. 1 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Dworkin, Is
Wealth a Value, 9 J. LEGAL STo. 191 (1980); Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STuD. 263 (1986).
4. For a brief account of this point in the context of medical malpractice, see E'rsm, THE MoRALS AND TECHNIQUE
OF MEIcA INNOVA-TION, IN MEDICAL INNOVATION AND BAD OtrcosMEs: LEGAL SOCIAL AND ETHICl.L REsPONSES, (Health
Administration Press, Ann Arbor, ed. M. Siegler) 137 (1987).
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could be set at one, we would inhabit Coase's friendlier, but unrecognizable world of
zero transaction cost in which our problems would disappear.) 5
There is a good way to split this difference. The narrower proposition that a good
consequentialist works with is that social utility will be advanced, as a first
approximation, 6 by specific rules that curb the use of force, lying, and misrepresen-
tation, and insure that persons keep their promises. The consistent application of
these principles can lead to the proper social ends, first by defining individual spheres
of control, and second by allowing people to correct by voluntary agreement any
mistakes in the initial allocation of resources made by the general law. This last point
rests on the ground that private parties are apt to have better information about their
own positions than the state, even if their information is-as seems necessarily the
case-itself highly imperfect.
One critical point about this system is that it invites, indeed requires, reasonably
clear rules. The function of the rules is to demarcate the zones of decision for
individual choice. When we speak of courts and nations, jurisdictional rules work
best when they are clear and well focused. This is why principles of territoriality, the
political analogue to property, persist into modem times, even though political
decisions have manifest economic spillover effects beyond territorial borders. 7 An
equally pressing need exists for clear rules to specify initial entitlements, and to
define their violation. Indeed as societies become more complex, the gains from
simple rules become ever greater. Families and small groups can adopt complex rules
to govern behavior because, given their commonality of interest, they can monitor
each other's behavior to assure compliance, and make the necessary informal
adjustments to novel or troublesome situations. 8 But for large social groups, the
desirable rules must be easily communicated across the large numbers of individuals
who are bound by them. Rules of thumb make the law workable.
The question then becomes, do we have any easy surrogates which tell us when
rules are simple and when they are complex. Here the litmus test of a complex rule
is any which makes use of the idea of "reasonableness" and the implicit cost-benefit,
or risk/utility calculus that it contains. In some sense it might be thought that to
criticize any legal system for its reliance upon a reasonableness test is to misstate a
source of legitimate modem concern. After all, how can a test which has been with
us for so long, as a central part of the law of negligence, be the source of any fresh
doubts about the soundness of the tort system? The answer is that while the
reasonableness standard itself is old, its application has traditionally been hemmed in
by the application of a variety of hard edged rules that did not depend upon the case
5. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Eco-. 1, 15-19 (1960).
6. I ignore here all the complications that arise out of the need for forced exchanges when voluntary transactions
cannot coordinate the problems of many separate persons with conflicting ambitions. For a discussion of those questions,
see R. Esm-rm, TAcsss: PRIVATE PROPrRv AND m Posse oF EF-%uNEr Do.traN (1985).
7. We know that people who live outside a state are "affected" by decisions within it. Yet could one imagine a
workable rule whereby these individuals could vote in state elections?
8. I stress this point in a newspaper column, Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World, Wall Street Journal,
June 27, 1985, at 30, col. 3.
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by case use of any risk/utility formula as such. The next section gives a few
examples.
II. SOME BRIGHT LINE RULES
A. Force
The first example of a bright line rule involves the use of force. The early
accounts of harm caused by one individual to another stressed the trespassory nature
of the defendant's action. He had to hit the plaintiff with a stick or a bullet, or run
him down with his coach. This physical "invasion" requirement filters out an
enormous number of cases that might otherwise be brought within the ambit of the
tort law-those cases which involve an asserted duty of the defendant to protect the
plaintiff against his own incompetence, or the aggression of a third person, for
example. Within the well-defined class of invasion cases, I have long argued that the
defendant should only be entitled to defenses based upon plaintiff's misconduct, and
not those based upon his own efforts to take the highest possible care. 9 Where the
invasion line is kept intact, the legal system made a mistake when it dwelled on the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. But the error was not too costly because
it did little to change the outcome in most cases. 10 In many cases, such as trespass,
Rylands v. Fletcher," and nuisance, strong pockets of strict liability survived even
when negligence principles were dominant. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
(originally announced in a case when defendant's barrel rolled out of a loft and struck
the hapless plaintiff below him)12 helps narrow the gap between negligence and strict
liability still further. Viewed as a whole, the common law of negligence in its earlier
version placed far less reliance on the reasonableness concept, than the modem rules
with their ever greater set of affirmative duties upon defendant.
B. Custom and Malpractice
Consider in this context the law of medical malpractice. Under the older view
the deviation from custom was exceptionally powerful evidence of negligence, and
the compliance with custom was virtually a safe harbor.' 3 The rule had strong bright
line characteristics, as compliance with custom insulated the defendant physician
from the case by case cost-benefit analysis which, as best anyone can tell, is the only
relevant alternative methodology. One can raise the objection that treating compli-
9. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas
in a Theory of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STD. 165 (1974). Here too the idea of reasonableness works its way into the
system at the back end, e.g., in cases of the use of excessive force in self-defense. See Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975). But only a tiny fraction of stranger cases are so complex as to turn on this very difficult set of
issues.
10. See for a discussion of the convergence across separate legal systems, Epstein, The Social Consequences of
Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1717 (1982); Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith
Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987); Kroll, Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy, 16 J. LEGAL STuD. 119 (1987).
11. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
12. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H&C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
13. See for the classical defense, Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 1147 (1942).
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ance with custom as an absolute defense allowed some cases to escape liability when
it should have been imposed. But the error costs in the opposite direction cannot be
ignored. The open-ended cost-benefit analysis confers upon the jury an enormous
degree of discretion and doubtless often results in the imposition of liability when
none should be had. (After all, if a jury is instructed that compliance with custom is
not an absoute defense, then to be faithful to its role, it cannot act as if it were, simply
because it prefers the older common law rule in principle.) Both kinds of errors are
costly to the system. It makes no sense to charge the physician who has behaved
properly with malpractice, as the costs imposed necessarily move medical care away
from the desired social levels. The costs of doing a cost-benefit analysis are
sufficiently high that we have moved to a system where we pay more money to get
less reliable decisions-which is our problem today.
C. Occupier's Liability
Occupier's liability is another area with recent doctrinal developments, which,
however, give rise to less concern. Here the older view was that patent defects were
not actionable, but latent defects were.14 The sense was that a trap was indeed a
source of danger to another party, and the law therefore worked to overcome the
inequality of information that otherwise existed. The modern standards in contrast
take, albeit cautiously, the view that it is possible to recover when the defects
themselves are patent. Overcoming information differentials is no longer the sole
purpose of the law. ' 5 But in so doing it is assumed that courts after the fact can make
better judgments about which risks should be assumed, and which not, than private
parties. The incentives, however, point quite the opposite way, as parties whose
welfare turns on making the right choice at the time should make far better
calculations than some third party long after the fact. We have, alas, the beginnings
of a system that drives us away from the contractual norm, with the predictable loss
in social welfare.
There is a need to be cautious about the law of occupier's liability, for it does
not seem to have moved in any dramatic fashion. Even the recent case of Becker v.
IRM Corporation,16 which announces strict liability against residential landlords,
confines its holding to cases in which there are latent defects that cause injury in
ordinary use. 17 Strict liability itself is neither a self-evident good nor a self-evident
bad until we answer the key question, "strict liability for what?" Strict liability for
the use of force, or for the setting of dangerous spring-guns or other traps is welcome,
while strict liability for not saving a plaintiff from acts of self-destruction is a very
different question, for it invites the prospect of holding everyone responsible for the
wrongs committed by everyone else. The court in Becker used a narrow account of
14. Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [19291 A.C. 358, which defended the categorical lines
among invitees, licensees, and trespassers, while recognizing that categories "rigid in law" had some give at the joint
in practice.
15. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 433 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
16. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
17. See supra notes 4-6.
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premise defect: the case involved a shower door made of untempered glass, which
posed a recognized safety hazard to a user who had slipped in the bathroom of his
rented apartment. If courts hew to this line, then it will go a long way toward keeping
this traditional head of liability within sensible boundaries.
D. Products Liability
The risks of the risk/utility formula have been most pronounced in the law of
products liability. Here the relationship between the basis of liability-negligence or
strict-and the definition of product defect-latent defect or risk/utility analysis-is
of exceptional importance. The choice between negligence and strict liability is
relatively unimportant if liability is confined to latent defects only. The expansion of
liability to patent defects has enormous consequences, even if liability is confined to
negligence theories. The reason the early law of products liability produced no
serious disruption of commercial insurance markets was that the wall between latent
and patent defects was not breached, even as strict liability had become the order of
the day.
To put the point in perspective, if one had to summarize the traditional law
before, say, 1968 in a couple of propositions, these are the two I would choose:1 8
First, ordinarily no liability for products with patent defects, and second, liability for
latent defects only if the product caused damage in ordinary use. The application of
these two tests was designed to make sure that liability existed only when (1) there
was differential knowledge or access to knowledge between the parties, and (2) no
misconduct of the plaintiff (who typically is using the product at the time of injury
and well able to prevent the loss) helped bring about the loss in question.
This system of liability may give the wrong answer in some cases. Still as a rule
of thumb it gives a clear, cheap, and correct answer in most cases. The distribution
of cases along the latent/patent axis is such that there are few cases when the line
between latent and patent is in doubt. By working to insure the easy transmission of
information, this account strengthens market institutions by helping consumers make
informed choices. Private contracts work fitfully at best before individual consumers
have purchased or used a wide variety of goods, and the prohibition against latent
defect spares producers from having to devise ways of providing independent
guarantees that the product sold meets its promised quality standards. What seller of
foodstuffs is able to provide warranties to all the people who eat its products? The
utter want of any concern about "contracting out" of products liability rules, and the
complete disinterest in undoing them through legislation is pretty strong evidence of
how close the common law rules once adhered to the social optimum.
The risk/utility formulas are a very different kettle of fish, as a bare listing of the
Wade factors shows. 19 While Professor Wade wrote as if his factor analysis offered
18. There would be qualifications, such as for drug and vaccine cases. There, most defects are latent, and the
traditional test was whether the drug meets FDA approval. The expansion of liability in the drug and vaccine cases all rests
upon the proposition that juries can second-guess administrative agencies like the FDA, which are known for their extreme
caution in letting new products onto the market.
19. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). The factors are:
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a convenient rationalization of existing tort law, he was an unwitting firebrand.
Risk/utility represents nothing less than a totally revolutionary way of looking at
products liability. The latent defect tests reinforce market disciplines. The risk/utility
test is a massive, if unintended, assault on markets and private ordering, for
defendants are now required to justify independently every decision that they and their
customers have made with respect to a product's use. No longer is it sufficient to say
that the defendant informed the plaintiff of the hazards involved. Instead it becomes
necessary to go behind the consent of consumers by finding expert testimony to
reconstruct their past decisions from the ground up. And for what end?
Surely it is not to control administrative costs. The traditional rules have massive
administrative efficiencies that are frittered away under Wade's risk/utility test.
Substantive certainty is sacrificed as well. Risk/utility opens up every machine tool
and every generic product to case-by-case attack within the judicial system: after all,
the mere fact that the risk was assumed can no longer be treated as decisive on the
reasonableness of the risk in question, even if relevant in some attenuated sense. But
for all the intrusiveness of his test, Wade never explains why ex post collective
judgments are superior to the ex ante judgments people make on their own. Yet surely
the obviousness of the danger (which surely conveys something of its seriousness as
well) is protection against both ordinary mistake and manufacturer misrepresentation
or deceit, both of which harken back to the traditional concern with latent defects.
And when the defect is patent, the ability to sell the product in the first instance is
surely diminished, so that there is a powerful market check against systematic product
abuse, one which the risk/utility test wholly ignores.
To see both the magnitude and the weakness of this entire risk/utility approach,
it is instructive to ask the questions: Where does the application of the risk/utility test
end, and why? If it can be used to decide whether certain features of a machine tool
should be replaced, why cannot it be used to answer the question of whether entire
classes of products, from handguns to convertible automobiles to alcohol should be
marketed at all?20 There is nothing in the disorganized array of relevant factors that
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of
the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness
or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of
general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance.
The influence of these tests have been enormous. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d
443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983). I have criticized the doctrine in
R. E'sme.n, MoDERN PRODucrs LYABsrry LAw 76-90 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984) (handguns); Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (handguns), rev'g Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La.
1983); Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982) (alcohol); Height v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 190
N.J. Super. 7, 461 A.2d 757 (1983) (motorcycle gas tank); Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1985)
(convertible car).
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prevents a single headstrong jury from making fundamental decisions about what may
be marketed and what may not be sold at all. Indeed, whenever the defendant has
obtained a directed verdict or summary judgment, the judicial decision sooner or later
returns to the "open and obvious" test whose supposed inadequacy ushered in the
risk/utility test in the first instance. In truth, it is no principled way to identify one
domain where open and obvious dominates and another where risk/utility prevails.
While we have been largely spared risk/utility in generic product cases, the risk/utility
test continues to work its mischief by undermining countless standardized product
warnings and designs.
There is, moreover, nothing about the parade of utilitarian factors that justifies
the risk/utility test on any utilitarian grounds. Quite the opposite, its cost and
unreliability suggest that it should be banished from the legal system. The older view,
which said, let us control force and fraud, does have application to products liability.
It explains why the latent/patent distinction, while widely rejected today, has far more
intellectual staying power than the voguish, complex, multifactored test that has
replaced it. The latent/patent distinction can yield the clean yes/no answer necessary
on the issue of liability. In contrast, the Wade factors are utterly untranslatable into
yes/no inquiry. We are asked, for example, to take a wide range of variables with
continuous distributions, but without preassigned weights, and to meld them into a
single yes/no judgment on the question of product defect.
A cursory inspection of the text shows how difficult that task is to execute. Who
can decide what the total levels of social utility are, as set out in factor #1? Nor is
there any single "substitute product" against which the challenged product can be
compared, as factor #3 might suggest. There are in reality a large number of different
products (all of which can be configured in different ways) which may be the baseline
on comparative analysis. These alternative products may not "eliminate" the risk, as
suggested in factor #4. They may reduce it by an uncertain amount. Alternatively
they may increase the probability of injury but reduce the anticipated severity of the
injuries that do occur. Nor must a substitute product meet the "same" need. It could
only meet some portion of the need and perhaps at some greater, or different, cost.
And the ability to respond to changes in liability rules may be met only in part by
changes in price or insurance coverage, as noted in factor #7.
With variables so numerous, the ingenuity of lawyers should never be doubted
when the stakes in litigation are very high and discovery underregulated. The test is
couched in an offhand way that makes difficult matters of degree look as though they
involved simple distinctions in kind. It is a utilitarian nightmare. What starts out as
a faithful application of the utilitarian calculus ends up as an unprincipled battle of the
experts. Everything is admissible; nothing is quantifiable; nothing is dispositive. The
degree of freedom left to the trier of fact after trial is as great as it was before. All
too often, anything from a plaintiff's verdict for punitive damages to a defendant's
verdict of no liability is consistent with the evidence. And it is all quite unnecessary;
"awareness" in factor #6 points to the key element of knowledge, and usually gives
more useful information than everything else taken together.
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Nonetheless, once courts are committed to risk/utility, it quickly becomes clear
that they have no formal test of liability equal to the task of sorting out the cases they
must decide. Courts have quite naturally been most reluctant to grant any defendant
(or plaintiff) a summary judgment, which is likely to be reversed on appeal in any
event. Instead, judges are encouraged to hide behind the verdict, which decides
without reasoning. The rise of the jury in modem law is no accident.2 1 It is an
inevitable consequence of the present level of doctrinal poverty. Error costs and
administrative costs continue to rise, and only the lawyers and experts, whose skills
are necessary to navigate the morass, are able to turn a profit. For in these times the
best legal and professional talent is strictly necessary to handle any complex case.
III. CONCLUSION
So we return to our original theme. One can find the odd difficult case under the
older common law rules. But as a general rule, it is quite easy to decide who has hit
whom, who has complied with the rules of the road, who has complied with statute
or custom, or who has sold a product with a latent defect dangerous in ordinary use.
These are rules with bite in routine cases. It is not equally possible to decide whether
a product is too dangerous or too safe. The legal system today spends an enormous
amount of energy and effort to make these impossible substantive judgments. In so
doing it insures that no product nor any medical treatment is ever safe from judicial
challenge. The spate of balancing tests that are so common today is a recipe for
continued institutional dislocation. And that, alas, is the road down which modem
courts and legislatures have taken us, today more than ever before.
21. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985).
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